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    844 • ¦ ^^^;^^^ ^^^- -' ¦ ¦¦ ; • . ¦ ^^S...

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    Comte's Positive Philosophy.. • ¦ ' By G...

    celestial events at any period whatever , made from a very small number of direct observations , our foresight here is quite limited in its range , and , when certainty is desired , scarcely ever admitting of our leaving present circumstances out of viewv For similar reasons , the speculative superiority of physics over the rest of natural philosophy , is equally incontestable . It has also to be observed that the philosophical study of physics , regarded as a general means of intellectual education , possesses a special utility , not to be found elsewhere to the same extent ; it enables us completely to apprehend , the fundamental art of experimenting , which we have seen is particularly adopted to

    physics . It is there that true philosophers , whatever the peculiar object of their habitual pursuits , must always go , to understand what constitutes the true experimental spirit , to learn the characteristic conditions requisite in experiments that are capable of showing unequivocally the actual laws of p henomena , and finally to form a just conception of the ingenious precautions by which we may prevent any interference with the results of a process of such delicacy . Every one of the fundamental sciences presents the essential characteristics of the positive method , which are necessarily manifested in them iii a degree more or less decided ; but besides this ,

    each of them as naturally shows some philosophical indications belonging peculiarly to itself , as we have already remarked in the case of astronomy ; and it is always at their source that such conceptions of universal logic ought to be examined , under pain of filming an imperfect estimate of them . It is to Mathematics alone that we are indebted for our knowledge of the elementary conditions of positivism : Astronomy characterises with precision the true study of nature ; Physics specially presents us with the theory of experiment ; it is from Chemistry that we must borrow the general art of Nomenclature ; and finally , the science of Organized Bodies can

    alone unfold to us the true theory of Classifications . Newton ' s assertion , Hypotheses non jingo—I make no hypothesis , Has been incessantly repeated by men who fancy themselves Baconian thinkers when they restrict their incompetence to what they call " facts . " I need tell no reader of these papers that such ideas of science are utterly irrational . Newton himself gives it no countenance . ' His own great discovery was an Hypothesis at first , and only became a Theory after verification . Kepler made nineteen hypotheses respecting the form of the planetary orbits , and abandoned them one by one till he settled on the elliptical form , which , on verification , proved correct , and then was no longer an hypothesis .

    Every one who has made any original Scientific researches , must have a vivid sense of the indispensable utility of Hypothesis as an artificial aid , accompanied by an equally vivid sense of the necessity of distinctly understanding its purpose and limits ; and to this end I emphatiqally urge the reader to study what Comte and John Stuart Mill { Logic , Book iii . ch . xiv . ) have written on the subject ; the more so , as J ) x . Whewell in this , and indeed in so many other respects , betrays the essentially metaphysical condition of his mind . Mill ' s Logic the reader has , or ought to have , at hand . Comte teaches thus : —A law of nature can only be discovered by Induction or Deduction . Often , however , neither method is of itself sufficient

    without our previously making temporary suppositions regarding some of the very facts of which we are in search . This indispensable mode of proceeding has been most fruitful in its results , hut from neglect of the condition on which it can be rightly used the progress of true science has been much obstructed . This condition , but vaguely analyzed as yet , may be thus stated : —that we must never imagine any hypotheses which are not by nature susceptible of a positive verification , sooner or later , and which shall have exactly that degree of precision ascertainable in the study of the corresponding phenomena . In other words , truly philosophical hypotheses must always present the character of simple anticipations of what experience and reasoning are capable of at once discovering if the circumstances of the

    problem were more favourable . But if we would pretend to attain , by means of an hypothesis , anything that is in its nature altogether inaccessible to observation and to reason , we should overlook the fundamental condition of all hypothesis , and our supposition , transcending the real sphere of science , would become misleading and dangerous . It would become dangerous because every positive thinker agrees that our scientific enquiries arc restricted to the analysis of phenomena to discover their Laws , and in no sense to discover their Causes , essential or final . And how should a pure supposition , such as an Hypothesis , have a deeper plummet lino to futhom the unfathomable ? Therefore every hypothesis which traverses the limit of positive science can only lead to interminable

    discussion , never to solid agreement . The different hypotheses still employed by natural philosophers arc dourly distinguishable into two classes : the one , as yet small in extent , simply refer to the laws of the phenomena : the other , which plays a much more extended part , relate to the determination of the general agonts supposed to produce the different kinds of phenomena . Now , according to the rule just laid down , the first class ia alone admissible ; the second , essentially chimerical , lias nn anti-scientific character , and can only obstruct the real progress of physics . In astronomy , the first kind of hypothesis is alone employed ; the use of the second was long ago exploded . We no longer suppose the existence of chimerical fluids to explain the movement of the heavenly bodies . Why , then , in physics use hypotheses without the requisite precautions , and imagine fluids and others , invisible , intangible ,

    imponderable , and inseparable front the substances to which they impart their virtues , in order to explain the phenomena of heat , light > electricity magnetism ? The very fact that the existence of these pretended fluids is * from their nature , incapable of negation or affirmation , shows thjat they are beyond the reach of positive 'control . ' You iraignt as well admit the exists enee of the elemental spirits of Paracelsus , of angels , and of genii ! '' 33 ^ assumption of these entities in science , so far from helping to explain phenomena , has the very reverse effect ; it increases the number of things re * quiring explanation . For whence come the properties of these fluids ? On what do they depend ? It is evident that they demand explanation ag much as the phenomena they are introduced to explain ; they are the tortoise-back upon \ vhich the world is supposed to rest . Newton could not conceive attraction otherwise than through the agency of an ether . No

    one believes in that attracting medium now ; yet men of science , especially in England , will be up in arms at the heresy of supposing that light , heat , or electricity , can be robbed of their mysterious fluid . Because it will sound heretical , I strengthen Comte ' s position by the following passage from John Mill : —' " The prevailing hypothesis of a luminiferous ether I cannot but consider , with M . Comte , to be tainted with the same vice . It can neverjjbe brought to the test

    of observation , because the ether is supposed wanting in all the jiroperties b y means of which our senses take cognizance of external phenomena . It can neither be seen , heard , smelt , tasted , nor touched . The possibility ^ of ^ supposed laws a considerable number of the phenomena of : . light , is the sole evidence of its existence that we have ever to hope for ; and this evidence cannot be of the smallest value , because we cannot have , in the case of such an hypothesis , the assurance that if the hypothesis be false it must lead to results at variance with

    the true facts . ' ¦**¦ Accordingly , most thinkers of any degree of sobriety allow , that an hypothesis of this kind is not to be received as probably true because it accotmtafor all the known phenomena ; since this is a condition often fulfUled equally well by two conflicting hypotheses ; antf if we give ourselves the license of inventing the causes themselves as well as their laws , a person of fertile imaginationmighfrdevisea hunclrecl modes of accounting for any given fact , while there ; are probably a thousand more which are equally possible , but which , for want of anything analogous incur

    experience , our minds are unfitted to conceive . But it , seeinB tp be thought that an hypothesis of the sort in question is entitled to a ^^ nore favoim ^ recep > ion , if besides accounting for all the facts previoiKty knqwn » ** . i »' a & 'led , : tp .. the . ' -anticipation and prediction of others which experience afterwards verified j aa the undulatory theory of light led to the prediction , subsequently realized , by experiment , that two luminous rays might meet each other in such a manner as . to produce darkness Such predictions and the ^ fulfilment are / indeed , well calculated to strike the ignorant vulgar , whose faith in science rests solely on similar coincidences ! i betweenits prophecies and what conies to pass . But it is strange that any considerable stress

    should be laid upon such a coincidence by scientific thinkers , Jt the laws 01 tne propagation of light accord , with those of the vibrations of an elastic fluid in as many respects as is necessary to make the hypothesis a plausible explanation oral or most of the phenomena known at the time , it is nothing strange that they should accord with each other in pne respect more . Though twenty such coincn dences should occur , they would not prove the reality of the undulatory ether ; it would not follow that the phenomena of light were results of the laws of elastic fluids , but at most that they are governed by laws in some measure analogous to these ; which , we may observe , is already certain , from the fact that the hypothesis such harmonies

    in question could be for a moment tenable . There are many running through the laws of phenomena in . other respects radically distinct , ^ remarkable resemblance between the laws of light and many of the laws ot heat ( while others are aa remarkably different , ) is a case in point . There « an extraordinary similarity running through the properties , considered generally , of certain substances , as chlorine , iodine , and brome , or sulphur and p hosphorus j so much so that when chemists discover any new property of the one , they not only are not surprised , but expect , to find that the other or others have a property analogous to it . But the hypothesis that chlorine , iodine , and brome , or that sulphur ana phosphorus , are the same substances , would , no doubt , be quite inadmissible . themselves

    « I do not , like M . Comte , altogether condemn those who employ in working out into detail this sort of hypotheses ; it is useful to ascertain what are the known phenomena to the laws of which , those pf the subject of inquiry bear tne greatest , or even a great analogy , since this may suggest ( as in the case or t ) luminiferous ether it actually did ) experiments to determine whether the analogy which goes so far docs not extend still further . But that in doing ttiw , nun * should imagine themselves to be seriously inquiring whether the hypothesis ot a ether , an electric fluid , or the like , is true ; that they should fancy lipossible w obtain the assurance that the phenomena are produced in that way and no ot , seems to mo , I con ^ e , as unworthy of tho present improved conceptions or methods of physical science , as ifc does to M . Comte . And at tho risk ot dou » b astonishment tnat a

    charged with want of modesty , I cannot help expressing y losopher of the extraordinary attainments of Mr . Wliewoll should have wn ^ an elaborate treatise on the philosophy of induction , in which he recognises o , lutoly ' no mode of induction except that of trying hypothesis after hypothesis u one is found which fits the phenomena ; which one , when found , is to be assu ^ aa true , with no other reservation than that if on ro-oxamination it BliojW wv to assumo more than is needful for explaining tho phenomena , the SU P ^ ™ L , of the assumption should bo cut off . It is no exaggeration to say that tne > pi ¦ ^ which wo have described in these few words , is tho beginning , middle , ana o ^ the philosophy of induction aa Mr . Whowoll conceives it . And this w n thflfc slightest distinction between the cases in which it may bo known boloronan ^ two diflbront hypothoscs cannot load to tho same result , and those in ™» » aught wo can over know , tlio * ango of suppositions , all equally consistent ! win

    phonomonu , may bo infinite . . Comte clearly shows how this conception of Ethers is only a remnant o , the Metaphysical stage , and remarks that the metaphysical origin ot false method of proceeding cannot but be easily detected by every * rr . mind who will consider the fluids as having taken the place of the «•* the transformation of the latter being simply hy materializing them ,

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• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), June 5, 1852, page 20, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_05061852/page/20/