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    AUWST 4, 185».] THB LEADER. 745

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    )<> PHQGttESS OF KUSSIAN POLICY IN },,tj...

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    Torture In India. A Paitffui, Sensation ...

    8 UB » without a morsel of bread or a drop of water , until nature gives way , and the witness Attests whatever lie is bid . Or a tKird will be plunged knee-deep into putrid ordure , and there held bound night and day until the desired object be attained . Sometimes , instead of torture , recourse is had to bribery , and—however incredible it ; may sound to English ears—men have been induced by the promise of a hundred rupees ( 10 / . ) , to declare themselves guilty of a murder they never committed . It is true they are assured that

    their life is in no danger , and when they discover their peril it is too late to break through the mesh that has been woven around them . For ordinary witnesses are always procurable at exceedingly low rates—one rupee , or two shillings , per head being considered a handsome remuneration for an easy day ' s work . And perjury , never at any time viewed with much horror , is now held of small account since the substitution of a simple declaration , in place of the more binding attestation of the Koran or the waters of the Ganges .

    ,, But , it may be asked , whence comes this so great desire ou the part of the police to obtain a conviction ? Our answer may be briefly given . If any delay takes place in discovering the perpetrators of a crime , the chief police-officer of the district is warned that , if he do not apprehend the offenders within a certain period , he will be dismissed from his post . With this threat impending over his nead , it is not surprising that he should endeavour , by fair means or foul , to

    implicate some poor wretch , no matter how innocent . Besides , the inadequate salaries paid to the police render them peculiarly liable to corruption , and Orientals , in general , may be accused of having an itching palm . TIiub , perhaps , the principal landholder , or other great man , in the neighbourhood , bears a grudge against some poor villager or peasant . A . crime is reported at the

    ¦ police-station : sons of Belial come forward % o bear witness against Naboth : he is seized and tortured till he confess ; and the puzzled though doubting magistrate has . oftentimes no alternative , but to convict . Justice is both a rare and a costly commodity in the ISast . Witnesses are brought up by scores , iand the longest purse has the best chance of a favourable verdict .

    > ,, This is no new state of things of which we apeak . It has long been notorious that our entire system was defective—that the police were corrupt and inefficient ; , tho native officials and magistrates open to bribery and iintiaudation , the mode of procedure in our ; cpurte tedious , expensive , and unsatisfactory ^ and that the European judges were incompetent to unravel tho web of Asiatic fraud and chicanery . But no stops have boon tnken to

    tct , upon this knowledge . Aiul it will ever tie a stigma on the East India Company that , Under their sway , hardly a , single improvejnpnt has been introduced into their mlnunisifotion except under tho influence of public flWnion at home . How long this state of Political coma is to l ; e endured we will not r * ke upon , ourselves to determine ; but wo . Jfllieve that no permanent amelioration can to expected until the Government of India ryflassumed by tho Crown . . <»„ . .. ., —¦

    Auwst 4, 185».] Thb Leader. 745

    AUWST 4 , 185 » . ] THB LEADER . 745

    )<> Phqgttess Of Kussian Policy In },,Tj...

    )<> PHQGttESS OF KUSSIAN POLICY IN } ,, ., , ,. CKNTUAL . ASIA , !<< ;••' , ' ( SKCOMO AIITIC'UC . ) Jffljfa , a common remark thait Afghanistan forms , as ^ fc ^ fjprQ j , ^ he outworks of our Indian possessions ; 1 | H . 2 W $ , £ . < X ^ truth it nmy bo asiid that tho t Wgqonx of Persia lrnu hitherto constituted a sort w neutral ground occupied by tho vedottes of 'BuMta ' and England . The importance of mnin-Jwwng : friendly relations with that country has 'wnfrbtea appreciated by both those Powers ; but

    for man / years past the influence of the Russians —owing to their proximity and their brutal insolence—nas been decidedly predominant . IFrom the reign of Peter I ., the hereditary policy of the Czars—working by force and fraud , and directed by an irresponsible despotic chief—has been gradually and irresistibly extending both their moral and their material power to the southward and eastward . The interposition of the Ottoman Empire tended to conceal for a time from Europe the Muscovite encroachments in Central Asia , and it is only of late years that we have discovered the full extent of the danger that

    menaces our ascendancy in the East . When the curtain was first drawn aside , the peril appeared all the more imminent and terrible from our previous ignorance of its existence . In India , especially , a panic seized all ranks and classes of Europeans , and , perhaps , no one was more seriously alarmed than the Governor-General and his immediate advisers . No doubt , the Rtissophobia at that conjuncture assumed dimensions out of all proportion to the real magnitude of the danger . But that there were sufficient grounds for considerable anxiety and uneasiness , may be easily shown bv a hasty review of our relations with Persia during the last fifty yeais .

    It was at the close of the eighteenth century that the Government of India first felt the _ necessity of holding political coirnnunicjitions with the Court of Teheran . The Marquis of Wellesley very soon after his arrival in the East became aware of the danger that menaced our north-west frontier through the ambition of Shah Zeman , the ruler of the Afghans . It was notorious that Sultan Tippoo was endeavourinir to form an offensive and

    defensive alliance with the Sikhs , and it had also transpired that Wuzeer Ali , of Oude , had tempted Shah Zeman with an immense sum of money to invade the British territories . Under these circumstances , Lord Wellesley deemed it expedient to effect a diversion by raising up an enemy to the Afghan prince . The opportunity was , besides , favourable ; for Futteh Ali Shah had alread _ yconceived the design of annexing the principalities of Candahar and Herat to the kingdom of Persia .

    His lordship accordinglv instructed Mehdi Ah Khan , a naturalised Persian nobleman , at that time the Company ' s agent at Bushire , to take such measures as might induce the Shah-in-Shah to keep the Afghans in check , but not to urge him to overt acts of hostility . To effect this purpose the Khan was authorised to expend annually two or three lakhs of rupees , to gain the goodwill and support of the Shah ' s chief advisers . Futteh Ali , indeed , needed no great persuasion to adopt a course he had previously marked out for himself , and in 1709 and the following year he twice invaded Khorassan , thus compelling Shah Zeman to defer for a time his projected descent

    upon Hindostan . On his Majesty s return Teheran in the autumn of 1800 , he accorded a gracious reception to the British Mission under Captain , afterwards Sir John , Malcolm , who was empowered to conclude a treaty with the Shah for the more immediate object of counteracting French influence . Napoleon ' s brilliant campaign in Egypt had inspired the Oriental nations with a high reverence for his name and the power of his people , and in an equal proportion had tilled tho Indian Government with anxiety and dismay . It seemed no such very arduous undertaking for enthusiastic sol

    an enterprising general and an - diery to force their way to the Persian Gulf , and thence to invade our Indian territories both by sea and land . This catastrophe might , _ indeed , be part tall v averted by cherishing hostilities between Persia nnd the Afghans , but it would be rendered almost impossible were the French utterly excluded from the former country . The propositions submitted to the Shah with this view have been justly characterised as " an eternal disgrace to our ' Indian diplomacy . " They provided , that " should an army of the French nation , and deceit to settle

    actuated by design , attempt , with n view of establishing themselves on any of the islands or snores of Persia , a conjoint force shall bo appointed by the two high contracting parties to net in co-operation for their expulsion and extirpation , and to destroy and put m \ end to tho foundation of their treason ; and if any of tho great men of the French nation express a wish or desire to obtain a place of residence , or dwelling , in any of the islands or shores of the kingdom ol Persia , that they may raise tho standard of abode or settlement , leave for their residing in such ft plftco shall not be granted . " The governors

    of provinces were further to be instructed to " expel and extirpate the French , and never allow them to obtain a footing in any place ; " and fully empowered " ¦ to disgrace and slay the intruders . " According to M . Langl € s , the British Mission sipnally failed in tbis respect . " Leurs propositions ridicules et meme injurietises , " he says , "furent rejetees avec indignation par le Shah etpar ses mivistres . " Captain Malcolm , however , declares that this statement is " exactly opposed to the truth , " plumes himself upon the success that attended h ' s negotiations . But there is every reason to believe that this treaty was , at least , never ratified , for it is excluded , from the Persian State Papers laid before the House of Commons ; and an 1806

    Governor Duncan stated his impression that its final ratification was not to take place -until the arrival of Haji Khalil at Calcutta—an event that never occurred , as we shall presently have to relate . Orientals are chiefly assailable through fear or cupidity . Captain Malcolm chose the latter alternative , and lavished such vast sums of money that the Persians imagined be was promised a per

    centage on whatever he expended . His prodigality gave rise to most exaggerated notions respecting the wealth of the British nation , and materially impeded the labours of his successors , who were wisely forbidden to follow such a silly and extravagant precedent . But Eastern etiquette required that such magnificence should be responded to with similar ostentation . The Shah , however , was by no means disposed to disburse his own treasures in this fruitless manner . He

    therefore commanded a rich Ispahan merchant , named Haji Khalil , to proceed upon this mission at his own expense . On the arrival of this personage at Bombay a guard of Sepoys was appointed as his escort , but unhappily an affray took place between the soldiers and some of the ambassador ' s suite , in which the unfortunate Haji accidentally lost his life . Great was the trepidation of the Supreme Council on receiving intelligence of this untoward event , but the Persian Government readily accepted the explanations that were offered , backed as they were by most liberal pensions , granted to the relatives of the deceased ;

    and a writer in the Calcutta Review reports n saying attributed to the minister of Shiraz , that " the English might kill ten ambassadors , if they paid for them at the same rate . " The affair would , no doubt , never again have been heard of , had not the Haji ' s nephew subsequently sought and obtained the Shah ' s permission to proceed to Bombay to recover the property left there by his uncle ; " he was at the same time instructed to solicit the aid of the Indian Government in

    checking the encroachments of Russia . Un fortunately the envoy was a better trader than diplomatist , and used much greater exertions to obtain an indemnity for his losses than to advance the political interests with which he was intrusted . II is arrogance and presumption effectually thwarted the wishes of the Shah , though it is scarcely probable that any other agent would have fared better at that particular juncture , for he reachedCalcutta shortly after the death of Lord Cornwallis , during the provisional government of Sir G . Barlow .

    This was in 1806 , at which period little apprehension was entertained with respect to Russia , although there lacked not sufficient grounds for a strong distrust . So far back as the reign ot Peter I ., the Persians in an evil hour besought the aid of their Muscovite neighbours against the revolted Lesghis . The Czar required but little pressing , and , for the first time in history , the Russian armies encamped on the shores of the Caspian . Under Catherine If . a Frenchman , M . de St . Genio , drew up a plan for the invasion Cashmere

    of Hindostan , by way of Bokhara and , which was laid before the Empress by 1 nnce Nassau Siegen , and has ever since been brooded over by the successive rulers of the Russian empire . It is indeed strange that the insidious and aggressive character of Muscovite policy Should so long have been viewed w . th secure apathy . Two years previous to Captain Malcoim a mission , the Emperor Paul had en ^« a «" 50 , 000 men from the Volga to « ° 7 «* J 5 £ 35 , 000 French soldiers , to bo ^^^^" w ? - Rhine , in invading Hindostan » nd ^ e SS and palpable proo ;>^« ^ ' yonP 180 O , fey ^ d s ^ s ^^ r ^^^

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Aug. 4, 1855, page 13, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_04081855/page/13/