On this page

• Text (2)

  Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

  • 

    , ^aEEM'._Iu ; iE AJDIE1B/. ~' . 7&3

  • 

    GERMANY. The political aspects of German...

• Transcript

  • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

    Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.

    The Polish Legion. The Wednesday Meeting...

    lufcion in Europe , if Mice evolved £ pom * he i eleepless fire of national feeling , cannot be guided orlimited by the * exigencies of English policy . When Warsaw speaks , Milan may reply , and Combrn may once more shut its : gates against the Austrian garrison . Because—and this is the truth which generous sympathisers sometimes forget — a people that revolts fights in its own interest , and not solely in the interest of " Western JJurope . " It is probable that Ministers would gladly arm and pay a Polish Legion , if they . could disconnect it from all political and ulterior objects . A Polish flag outside Sebastopol might produce disaffection within , and cause an uneasy motion to be felt throughout the Polish provinces of Russia . But after men of that nationality had shed their blood in the efforts of the desperate siege , painful questions would arise : Whether , for instance , the populations near Odessa and the Baltic Sea should not be defended , if induced to rise in behalf of the allied powers , or should be left to be dragooned , knouted , and hanged by imperial martial law ? * _ , Moreover , if a Polish Legion could be established , merely to give a vent to the military inclinations of a certain class of Poles , what would be the result ? Do Englishmen , ready as they are to boast that Britons never , never shall be slaves , conceive that the high-spirited exiles , who have suffered banishment , confiscation of property , social outlawry , and ruiu , in the cause of their national independence , would take arms merely to fill up the bloody chasms in the besieging ranks before ^ ebastopol ? Do they think that to pay them Swiss wages while they fight , and to grant them colonial allotments , or hospital pensions afterwards , would gather the bravest of the Polish people Under the flag of a mercenary Legion ? Have they so forgotten—under the wings of the Irench eagle—that men do not fight for bread alone , that they can approve and ratify the suggestions of an insolent correspondent of the Times , who asks the Poles why they do not secure clean beds , good food , beer , and the animal delight of injuring Russia by enlisting in the Foreign Legion ? In the first place , the Poles are too discreet ; secondly , they have too much self-respect . The worst of them , indeed , the beggars , the soldiers of fortune , the venal , the desperate , and those who do not keep in view the principles which alone render them a formidable nation , might enlist for the double pleasure of fighting against Russia and living a trooper's careless life , with rations , pay , and the chance of bootv . Wo ' have never concealed or overlooked the difficulties of the Polish question . Perhaps some Poles impute it to * us as a fault that we have not started , at their appeal , and hurried on a revolutionary crusade . But the problem is this : —Are wo to proclaim the dismemberment of the Russian Empire as tho distinct object of tho war , and shall we be pledged to fig ht until the Cabinets of Northern Europe consent to the restoration of Poland ? No bold man , who is not n bad man , woukI rush inconsiderately into such a conflict . But , if the enterprise bo attempted , it must be attempted sincerely . If the Poles revolt in our favour , and nt onr instigation , they must have their reward . / No mere arguments of tho recruiting sergeant will tempt the best of them into mercenary ranks . " The Poles are roprcsentod to tho world by their emigration , which is tho elite of thoir ; society . It is not , liko so many other emigrations , the relic of an expatriated faction , tho remxmnt of a vanquished army . It is r the perpetual nucleus to which tho moat

    ^ i ^ ^ * " " ^ ^——¦————"'^^^^^^ ¦¦^¦¦ " ^¦¦ iWBBi high-spirited -and chopeful of the people assort , and constitutes the faithful . manifestation of their national character . It does not ; decay with time , because it is continually recruited ; and it is not exhausted , because it never wastes its powers ^ in desultory , vague , or speculative undertakings . Such , we believe , is the ligfet in which , among this class of Poles , the English scheme of a Legion is regarded . The Legion , if once armed and organised , must ; be supported in an enterprise , not against Sebastopol only , but against Russian Poland , or it will be as unimportant asaband of Swiss mountaineers . A vast proportion of the male Polish population is now embodied in the armies of Russia , Austria , and Prussia , —300 , 000 in the first , 100 , 000 in the « econd , 60 , 000 in the third . About 150 , 000 men who now follow the plough might be taken from it for six months without starving their country , and with , even their passive aid an earnest and vigorous movement might paralyse the Russian forces throughout a large area of the empire . That , in spite of the hereditary arts employed to denationalise them , and to break their spirit by baffling their hopes , these men are , for the most part , disaffected to Russia , is proved by the iron rigour and incessant vigilance necessary to keep them in safe subjection . The fortress of Alexander , at Warsaw , is a confession , by the successive Czars , that they reign by the terror of arms in Poland . Our Liberals would do well to keep these considerations in view . If they desire to contend with Russia for a point of honour , and have the means of victory , let the war be left on its diplomatic basis . If , on the contrary , they see no security , unless in crippling the enemv , who is even now all but impregnably fortified , let them urge a Polish crusade ; but on this condition , that the struggle shall end not only in the rescue of the Ottoman Empire , but in the acknowledged restoration of Poland .

    , ^Aeem'._Iu ; Ie Ajdie1b/. ~' . 7&3

    , ^ aEEM ' . _ Iu iE AJDIE 1 B / . ~ ' . 7 & 3

    ¦ . '¦ ¦ fJkm 4 gWM & > J 3 £ 55 V 1

    Germany. The Political Aspects Of German...

    GERMANY . The political aspects of Germany , irrespective of the war , deserve attention . Since the overthrow of governments and the confusion of authority in 1848 , there has been no such development of public opiuion as that which is at present going on . The press teems with suggestions hostile to that bureaucratic policy which misrepresents before the world the tendencies of the German race . In all the states that allow free discussion , to whatever degree , speculations , dangerous to power , are ailoat . But the most significant manifestation ia the tenacity with which the Germans cling to their little remnants of civil liberty , and the politic resistance they oppose to the Confederate Diet . In Hanover , tho institutions conceded by fear , in 184 S , have survived the downfal of those which simultaneously arose throughout Germany . Tho King—a man of tho most despotic " predilections , but not remarkable for courage—incessantly strives to regain the ground he then surrendered . He has lately appealed to tho Central Government at Frankfort in aid of his design , but the Chambers , strong in their moral position , have disavowed tho authority of the Diet , and have represented to the King that he must determine tho relation of his crown with their privileges , in concert with them alone . A similar , and perhaps a more important defection from tho Federativo Assembly , is that of Wurteinberg . Tho Chamber of Doputies , in harmony with the reigning prince , have declared for a reform in the public and general law , on tho plea that tho existing Diet is incompetent , aud does not represent tho people of Germany . It ia simply

    composed of delegates , ^ cenedited by the various joveenraents , rand * estiEely free from public jontrol . Sueli a protest , in a variety of forms , has been made at different times by almost all the lesser German states . Austria ind Prussia , however , at variance on so many points , are agreed on this , and steadily discountenance every project of innovation . But the point is of the highes t importance and we trust the German nation will have the wisdom to persist in its claims . The Diet of Frankfort , formally deposed in 1851 , and reconstituted under Russian influences , is the incubus which presses on all the provincial estates , and neutralises their more liberal action . Before one German Government can enter into active co-operation with foreign powers , or undertake a course of internal reform , it must move to compliance the inert mind of the federation , or , if it be . a leading power , drag after it a mass of the unwieldy Bund . Not that the primal law of Germany prohibits separate action on the part of any state , but that , when it serves the interest of the great Courts , the Diet is invariably ready to prove that any policy obnoxious to them is a breach of federal obligations . Germany , in fact , has existed since 1815 under unnatural conditions . Austria and Prussia , though professing that their interests were identical , entered into the general settlement on terms which rendered a mutual policy impossible . Prussia enjoyed this singular advantage , that she was left with the greatest number of German subjects . Austria , while her territories were larger , incorporated with herselt many alien populations , and was more exposed to the dangers of civil strife . Austria , therefore , possessed of inferior German influences , relied on the aristocracy ot her estates , while Prussia , turning to account the national sentiment , affected to be the representative of Germany , and , through this arfrfiee ruled in the Frankfort Assembly . It will be remembered that , in 1851 , when the two power 3 were in arms , and had all but declared war , Austria resigned the nominal presidency of the Diet , and Prussia took the lead , de jure , which she had long exercised de facto- The consequence has been that Austria has established a system of statesmanship that connects her with the rest ot the Continent : her German action is subordinate to her European diplomacy . Prussia , on the contrary , wields an influence in Europe , solely because she wields an influence , scarcely less than paramount , in Germany . . ,. Tefc Austria and Prussia , with these diverging lines of policy , had principles in common to defend in the Federative Diet . A number of the lesser states evinced an early desire for political changes . Some ot fcneir I governments consented to rule by a new tenure , and called free parliaments to trame i their laws ; others invited the predominant i courts to aid them iu maintaining absolutism . The revolutions in Belgium , Brunswick , Saxonv , and Hesse , united the great powers under * the guarantees of the Holy Alliance j the provisional diets struggled for separate authority ; and Prince Metternioh adopted a political scheme—of which ho has erroneously been styled the inventor-to repress this liberal activity . It was by t \ ns course that ho weakened and impoverished the em pire , Austria being compelled by «« r K mission" to maintain the most costly police in Europe , was at length unable ft ¦« ££ " * the pressure , and became a political bankrupt " CLorferenee of Kussia upon t ^ occn . sion , was probably as much in ™ ?|^ iroM the Empetor X ^^^ V & m SL ^ a dangerous precedent on

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Aug. 4, 1855, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_04081855/page/11/