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    June 2, I860.] The header and Saturday A...

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    PRIVATE POLICY OF THE COURT. THE much-ta...

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    BIGHTS AND PRECEDENTS. IT is quite clear...

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  • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

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    June 2, I860.] The Header And Saturday A...

    June 2 , I 860 . ] The header and Saturday Analyst . 511

    Private Policy Of The Court. The Much-Ta...

    PRIVATE POLICY OF THE COURT . THE much-talked of letter from the Prince Regent of Prussia to the Prince Consort of England , a copy of which , has somehow been surreptitiously obtained by the French Empebob , whose acts and motives it unceremoniously dealt with , is only another proof , though certainly a startling one , of the extent to which a system of foreign and domestic politics is carried on in the highest quarters , for which the recognised Ministers of the Crown ore not held responsible . It is , of course , very convenient for noblemen and gentlemen occupying parliamentary station to be able to shirk in this way constitutional

    accountabilitybut it is a very bad thing for the country that they should be suffered to do so ; for it is , in fact , the establishment of a secret , capricious , and arbitrary influence in the most vital affairs of the nation—an influence which no great or patriotic Minister would tolerate for an hour . At home , we have the favourites and minions of the Court daily thwarting the policy of the administration , not only with impunity , but with ostentatious encouragement and reward . Lord Abeucobk votes against Ministers on questions of moment , yet he retains his place as Prince Albert ' s Groom of the Stole . * Lord Gbey ring-leads the Opposition to

    the ministerial measure of Reform ; and his brother , Sir Charles Gbey , " not only retains his place as confidential private secretary to the Prtnce ' Consort , but the colonelcy of the 3 rd Regiment of Foot is conferred upon him—as hateful and disgusting a job as ever was perpetrated in the worst of times . Lord Noemanby's exploits need not recapitulation ; yet his brother is retained in his place as Private Secretary to the Queen , and every opportunity is seized on for ostentatiously marking the social favour in which he and his fellow confidant in the secret correspondence of the Palace are held . Lord Clarendon , not satisfied with having a brother and a l > rother-in > law in the Cabinet , hopes , b £ compliance with the whispered wishes of the Court , to wriggle himself back into

    Downing Street once more : so he refuses to vote with the Government on the Paper Duty , and , matters not being as yet quite right for his return to power , his younger brother is translated from the See of Carlisle—to which he was only elevated the other day—to the fat fold of Durham , which ranks next to London in the statistics of Episcopacy . And so throughout every branch of administrative patronage , the friends of the people , the favourites of the nation , and those who have deserved well of the country , are compelled to stand by , while the obeisant tools of irresponsible authority are everywhere encouraged and rewarded . All this is bad enough , but it is at least known and obvious ; and if people are mean enough to submit mutely to its fiontinnnnee . thev have but themselves to blame . It is otherwise ¦

    with regard to foreign affairs . ] H ~~ T ~~ ~~ ' Public diplomacy as conducted in our time is hard enough to bear , Heaven knows ; but manifold as are its blunders and its jobs , it is nothing when compared with the private ^ diplomacy of complotting palaces and conspiring dynasties . This is the old resource of monarchical reaction , and a most formidable one it is . It is not enough that the royal houses of England and Prussia should be doubly united by ties of marriage , as they are said to be soon likely to be ; it is not enough that on every public and legitimate occasion national respect is shown by the Bational authorities in this country for all that Prussia loves to honour , while in return similar consideration is shown by Prussian Statesmen and politicians for all that we most love and reverence in England . Nothing will do but an illegitimate intermeddling , by means of clandestine correspondence between certain high Personages themselves , —and a precious mess they seem likely to make of it . Even in the interchange of sympathetic fears and hatreds regarding their Imperial neighbour , whom they despise as n parretm even more than they detest him as an apprehended aggressor , they do not seem to know how to avoid being overlooked or overheard , lhero is , no doubt , something sinister and shabby in the system of espionage which put Napoleon III . in possession of the intercepted letter . But is there nothing to be deprecated or despised m the system which keeps up elaborate and ostentatious pretensions of . friendship with * i . i » c » g !» J > ouring Court , while interchanging , secretly , vows of -detestation , and epithets of personal abuse P The alleged demand for explanations by the JfoEXCii Ambassador at Berlin has been contradicted in a semi-official way , and for might wo know or care there may have been no foundation whatever to this portion of the story . But the existence of the letter from the Prince Regent to the Piuxcjs Consort , in which the Imperial ally of both is spoken of as a brigand , hos not and cunuot be denied : and the Minister , whether Prussian or English , who alleots to look on unconcerned , will one day have much to answer for .

    Bights And Precedents. It Is Quite Clear...

    BIGHTS AND PRECEDENTS . IT is quite clear that when the House of Lords , with the probable connivance of the Premier , rejected the Paper Bill , they calculated only ' upon a conflict with Mx . Gladstone and the members of the Manchester School ; and those who visited the House of Commons on Friday must have been struck with the careless , flippant way in which a great number of its members were disposed to treat a very serious constitutional question , and one that strongly concerns all persons engaged in manufactures or commerce . The Lords have claimed a power to tax the

    people , not only without but against the consent of their representatives ; and the confidence which merchants and traders have hitherto felt in the power of the House of Commons to deal with fiscal questions has received a rude shock . When the Ministers of the Crown propose the imposition or the relaxation of a tax , it is considered certain that the assent of the Sovereign will not be withheld from the bill necessary to give it effect ; and , so soon as it has passed the House of Commons , the mercantile world has been accustomed to regard the question as settled , and to arrange its purchases , or imports and exports , upon the new basis provided .

    Theoretically , the House of Lords has possessed the power of rejecting any bill ; and even the Crown , according to abstract theory , miglit at the last moment refuse to sanction a measure which its own advisers had brought in . Our " matchless Constitution' * provides no simple and safe remedies for conflicts of authority among its component parts . In America , the veto power of the President , or of the Senate , is bounded by restrictions that take away the necessity for collision ; but in England the people , represented by the House of Commons , could only bring a refractory sovereign to his senses , or prevail against the Hereditary Oligarchy by measures which

    would throw the whole country into confusion . Two centuries "ago ., nothing short of an unpleasant surgical operation was found sufficient to reduce monarchy to the limits of common sense ; arid we should not have gained the Reform Bill of' 32 , except at the cost of a revolution , had not the sovereign been prevailed upon , to avert the danger by threatening to swamp the House of Peers . It is ridiculous to praise a Constitution that contains no provision for the peaceable and orderly solution of practical

    difficulties , and which is only kept going by compromises and shams that are discreditable to our age . If the country had been quite quiet , or the majority larger which Lord Palmekston could lead , the conduct of the Lords would have been silently submitted to ; but the people are not quite as apathetic as was expected , and the Premier cannot afford the loss of support that would follow capsizing the Cabinet boat and swimming ashore by himself . A committee to search for precedents may mean anvthinff . It may be a bland method of abandoning the rights

    of * the people , or a lego-quibbling way of supportiTigprlrem against a flagrant and dangerous attack . What it will be , depends mainly upon the attitude of the constituencies , as the book of the Constitution may be read forwards like English , backwards like Hebrew , or perpendicularly like Chinese . It is all very well to look for precedents ; but precedents had a beginning , and if one should be wanted for to-day , are we not as capable of making it as any of the worthies of olden time- ? . The House of Lords was not harmonized with the House of Commons at the time of the Reform Bill—the process has taken place by the gradual corruption of the elective assembly , and by makin" it little better than aii ante-chamber for the House of Peers . When the Constitutional right of the Commons was

    assailed year after year by the Lords in the matter of the Jew Bill , the pretensions of the hereditary Chamber were upheld by their relatives and dependants in " the other . place , ' and by the want of patriotism of the miscellaneous assemblage of jobbers who purchased the M . P .-ship to assist their financial schemes . Our Cabinets nre essentially aristocratic and anti-popular in their composition , and possess an immense power over the so-called independent senators , through the extravagant expenditure ot electoral contests . What would be thought of a Constitution

    containing an article that the Crown , acting through its ministers , should have the power of fining every member of Parliament from £ 1 , 000 to £ 5 , 000 , or £ 10 , 000 , whenever the body us a whole was not sufficiently obedient to their will ? This is , however ; the power in the hands of a British Cabinet ; and it js ridiculous to expect honest parliaments while so enormous a means of intimidation is permitted to exist . There are , doubtless , some men in the House of Commons who will not alow themselves to be influenced by these considerations , but they must of necessity bo few ; and , in considering the practical course to be taken in any emergency , the people must not , forget , that they huvo to deal with representatives who buy their seats at an extravagant price , and then , for the sake of preserving the value of tlte article they have paid for , uniformly refuse to

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), June 2, 1860, page 3, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_02061860/page/3/