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    108 THE LEADER. fNo. 306, Saturday

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    THE CLAIMS OP SARDINIA. We trust that no...

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    .LORD WTLNSLEYDALE AND LIFE PEERAGES. A ...

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    Ment Of His Diplomatic Career In The Uni...

    would not present risks and difficulties . High as the national spirit might rise , much as the efficiency of our armament may have been increased , Russia has almost incomparable -facilities of defence . Whether we fight or negotiate , it is as well to think calmly , to avoid exaggeration and bluster .

    Such is the tone of Parliament . In that assembly , the opinion undoubtedly reigns that another campaign would have illustrated more signally than hitherto the powers and resources of the English nation . At the same time , to reject reasonable terms of peace would involve a moral loss , and give a more favourable colour to the Russian cause . Accordingly

    Ahe Houses assent with obvious reserve to ¦ the policy of negotiation . Lord Clajbendon , who was more explicit than the Premier , acknowledged that the Russian acceptance of the Austrian proposal , was accompanied by the suggestion of an armistice , and . that this had been conceded by the Allies . But he made no reference to the " additional propositions , " contenting himself with stating , simply , that he believed in the sincerity of ^ Russia , that the Allies weie themselves sincere , and that

    nothing WQuld be exacted to degrade or lnflame the Russian Government , So far , therefore , the representatives of the several Powers , will meet on common ground . jEngland is ready , France is anxious , for peace . To Austria peace is safety , to Russia relief . It restores the natural relations of dynasties- — unites the absolutisms now at war , and leaves the French and English alliance to depend , as all . real alliances must depend , on mutual respect and confidence , instead of mutual aid , which is , at times , the source of jealousy , and wjhich . does not always lead to the brotherhood of armies .

    . Assuming that the negotiations prosper * that peace is established , there will be some C 0 . use for congratulation . We shall have passed through a crisis , in -which our reputation has been imperilled by the apathy and incapacity of our governing class . To them will the public mind be turned , to discover what guarantees may be . secured in the event of another war , Against the risks we have * ? fe ¦ £ &&• We may not always monopolise Jfoe offensive in warfare . How , then , can the

    national power be so organised that , if unhappy contests should arise , we may meet its dangers without taking two years to prepare an army and a . fleet , without losing prestige and surrendering the predominance to an all y ? In this war we have not had one complete success . Our navy has been a mere auxiliary . But we have now prepared the machinery of a real campaign , t > y land and sea , so that , we repeat , we are not negotiating with Russia from any inability to enforce by arms the objects which will be contended for at the Congress .

    108 The Leader. Fno. 306, Saturday

    108 THE LEADER . fNo . 306 , Saturday

    The Claims Op Sardinia. We Trust That No...

    THE CLAIMS OP SARDINIA . We trust that no disposition exists in the British and French Cabinets to assign to the representative of Sardinia a secondary place at the approaching Congress . Whatever may have been done by Austria as a mediator , Sardinia has done something as a belligerent . It is now a proper time , therefore , to consider under what circumstances the

    Piedmontese government joined its forces with ft ?? ° f Western Powers , and what axe the' political necessities created by that alliance . It is generally supposed that the ] $ emomtory symptoms of peace were viewed ^ % M , gratification at Turin , and it has been imputed to y 1 OT on Emmanuel that ho desired Lffi ^ convulsion , out of which a prize xrn ^ ffl ° t ^ for 8 a * d i * ia . We have no difficulty m conceiving that any patriotic

    Italian , upon the outbreak of an European war , might anticipate changes favourable to Italy ; but , without taking remote probabilities into calculation , Piedmont has reason to suspecji an Austrian peace . It is no secret that when Victor Emmanuel was in En gland he already understood that , if the Western Powers were reconciled to Russia , he might be

    sacrificed to a quietus of diplomacy . Could he , or the nation he governs , be assured that they had not exasperated old jealousies , without securing new friendships ? It was this scepticism that was expressed by the more impatient Liberals in Turin , and we are not sure that Victor Emmanuel went from London better satisfied than when he came .

    Justice and sound policy require that we should remember the circumstances under which Sardinia was drawn into the alliance . She did not occupy an independent position . It may be said , in fact , that she had but the alternative of adopting the cause of the Western Powers , or suffering for her neutrality . Diplomacy , of course , would be a clums y process if it left , in written documents , the record of its menacing insinuations ; but , in effect , Sardinia was challenged to choose between the hazards of an alliance with the

    Western Powers and the dangers of Austrian hostility , with the jealousy of another Government in the background . The kindlier pressure was probably exerted by England : possibly , indeed , this Italian covenant was sought to aid in counterbalancing the preponderance , visible from the beginningof the war , of French arms and counsels . Had the congress of pacificators been appointed to meet in London , we should probably have heard no whisper of the diplomatic subordination of Sardinia .

    The incident in Tuscany , combined with others , Jhad proved to Sardinia that she stood in need of guarantees ; not against Austria only ; since it cannot be for the interest of any absolute Government that free institutions should prosper in Ital y . It was therefore partly with the object of providing herself with these guarantees that Sardinia pledged herself to share the exertions and sacrifices of the Western Powers . To those who knew the state of feeling at Turin , it was obvious that a thoughtful section of the public dissented from the adopted policy because it doubted the good

    faith of the English governing classes . Count Cavoue scarcely procured credit for his patriotism in promoting the alliance ; but his views on the subject are not unknown . When the war commenced , was ho blind to the possibility of Sardinia being dragged into it ? When the pressure of the British representations was felt in Victor Emmanuel's Cabinet , was Count Cavour ignorant of the risk ? Was the public kept uninformed ? The Diritto , the leading liberal journal , pointed out clearly the perils of the future ; the Piemonte ^ with less sincerity , hinted at them .

    We must not forget that Sardinia , when she took the field against Russia , acted with rare courage and magnanimity . She was not a military Power ; her prosperity was insecure ; her armies had recently come out of the exhausting Austrian war ; with a population not double that of London , she had considerable frontiers to guard , and was entering upon a process of radical internal reform . At such a crisis , with hostile or suspicious Governments on alL sides , did Sardinia engage in a great war , by the side of England and France .

    The war has gained for her the recognition of Europe . It has brought prestige to her army , and importance to her Cabinot . But it has taxed her revenue , which , after many disasters , required assiduous cultivation ; it hivs arrestod the course of lib eral innovation , and has thus produced only mitigated advantages .

    If , however , it has created for Sardinia positive claims on England , Count Cavour ' s policy would have been patriotic and wise , even if it had not been inevitable . Has it created such claims ? The question may test the good faith of the British Government , and of the British nation , if ever the nation assert a policy of its own . At all events , right-minded men , in and out of Parliament , must perceive that there was" no justification of the policy which dragged Sardinia into the Western alliance , unless her aid is to be reciprocated by the support of England in her eventual difficulties . It

    is impossible to deny that we are morally pledged to maintain the independence of our Italian allies , so long as they respect the public law of Europe . To give effect to this principle , the claims of Victor Emmanuel's representative must be recognised on an equality with the great Powers , at the Paris Congress . It would , indeed , be a reproach upon the British name , if , in our need , we enticed a weak State into war , and left it afterwards to struggle for existence with overbearing enemies . What Sardinia requires is the avowed political sympathy of England . That will be one guarantee—to her of independence ; to Europe , perhaps , of peace .

    .Lord Wtlnsleydale And Life Peerages. A ...

    . LORD WTLNSLEYDALE AND LIFE PEERAGES . A grand debate is announced for next week , on . a high constitutional question . As the Morning Herald is the organ for the announcement , we suppose that the good old Tory party is about to stand up for the British Constitution against the innovation caused by the creation , of Mr . Baron Parke to be Baron Wensletdale for the term of his natural life .

    The Morning Herald states that all the Law Lords are of opinion that this creation of life peerages is unconstitutional and open to the gravest abuses . It is difficult to say what is unconstitutional or not , inasmuch as the Constitution is totally undefined , and has been nibbled away by modern Acts of Parliament until the , law of the country is about as unconstitutional a thing as exists in the world .

    The best exponent of the British Constitution , perhaps , consists in the Bill of Rights , with its glorious antecedents , the Great Charter . And yet , if any Englishman were to take the trouble of perusing the Charter exacted for the people when the Orange dynasty was established on the throne , he would find that we have desperately fallen away from that high standard of the British Constitution . A Law

    Lord more or less , thoiigh we are not to have the sons of the sam e to boot , will not make much difference . But the argument , of course , is this , —that if the Crown can appoint life peerages , it will hold in its hands the means of swamping the real Peers , and will undermine and overthrow the hereditary character of the peerage . This is rather true , and it is quite possible that popularity-hunting Ministers might crowd the House of Lords with pro fessional men , railway directors , groat

    contractors , and all the rich and clever outcasts of the Commons , as tenants for life . But , rually , there seems to be no reason to suspect such a design in the present act . It originates in the difficulty of keeping up a sufficient number of Law Lords to do the business ; and those wo have are most of thorn getting very old . The judges onco sat as a constituent prut of the

    grand council of the nation—the Parliament . They slipped out of their place in the reign of Edward the Third , and became " assistants . " They had disappeared before tho Revolution , and Lord Someks vainly tried to bring ( hern back into iho House by summons — ewn scolded them in vain . Tho scanty allowance of Law Lords is eked out by making a coup le of Lay Lords to sit with thorn and represent

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Feb. 2, 1856, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_02021856/page/12/