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    July 1, 1854.] THE LEADER. 60S

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    Parliament Of The Week. Lord Aberdeen Is...

    but , instead of exacting anything like territorial indemnity , she at once pressed for additional privileges , and if she had obtained those additional privileges for her co-religionists in the Turkish empire , I have 110 doubt that the invasion of the Principalities -would never have taken place , or would immediately have ceased on the Sultan complying with her demands . But of course we felt—Europe felt—that the independence of Turkey would ba as much endangered by the cession of such rights and privileges as were claimed by Russia , as it would have been had she made a positive demand for territorial indemnity ; and therefore it-was that the pretensions of Bussia were resisted . " Mow , my lords , I have been supposed to say also that I desired , or did not object , to a return to the treaty of

    Adrianople , because I stated that if we could obtain a peace which sbonld last for twenty-five years we should not do amiss . ( Hear . " ) Nor should we ; but when 1 said that I never foi 5 a moment meant to convey the impression which it seems my words have produced . I never said a word to imply that I desired to return to the treaty of Airianople . What I said , or intended to say , was , that the treaty of Adrianople has given us peace for twentyfive yews , and that it by any treaty which the fortune of ¦ war might enable us to make , we should secure peace for an equal length of time , we should mot , considering the instability of all human afiairs , do so very far amiss . Therefore , niy lords , I am quite at a loss to conceive upon what ground -any one should dare-to say , first , that I have claimed

    the honour of making the treaty of Adrianople , and , next , that I approved of or was indifferent to its conditions , and . ¦ was ready to renew it without reference to the present posture of affairs . I have explained to your lordships bow it ca m * that I insisted the other evening upon the limited extent of the ' territorial acquisitions ¦ which Russia has made in consequence of the treaty of Adrianople . My statement upon that point is perfectly true ; it is incontrovertible ; but it was intended to be qualified in the . manner which I have now stated to . your lordships , I feel , therefore , that liave nothing further to say of the treaty of Axlrianople . " It has also been said that I recommended a return to the status quo , or , at least , that I would not object to ir . Now , my lords , this statement surprises me more than anything , because I thought I had taken special care to explain

    that point in my answer to the observations of my noble and learned friend . I stated that that might be the cause of some apparently ambiguous expressions -used by Austria and by Prussia , as compared with the expressions used by ourselves , and I said that Austria and Prussia might be desirous to restore the status quo ; but , at the same time , I made the specific declaration , that that was by no means applicable to us—that is , to England and France . You are aware , my lords , that before the declaration of war the status quo was all that we hoped for—all that we desired—all that we attempted to obtain , and that was the condition which the Turkish Government signified its "willingness to agree to . The treaty of Vienna was framed upon the understanding agreed to by all the four powers , that the relations between

    . Russia-and lurkey should revert to the status quo . "VVe thought that was quite as much as the Emperor of Russia could expect us to offer , and much more than he hadiany right to expect . But , my lords , we proposed that in the hope that we should be able to preserve the state of peace , and that we should be able to avert our entering upon n course where all the evil passions that war engenders would be lot loose . But the instant that war was declared , the state of the question was entirely altered . ( Loud cheers . ) From that moment everything depended upon the war itself , and we are left free to exercise our own judgment—to do that which we think will best suit our own interests nnd policy in framing the terms of peace . From that moment tho statm quo was entirely at an end . ( Cheers . ) Vcrv

    well . 1 also said , as to tho terms of peace , that however desirable , however necessary we might think certain torins to fce , still it would bo unwise in us now , in the present stato of the war , to lay down any conditions of peace as those to whiuh alone wo will accede . These must depend upon tho ovents of the -war ; mid in tho debate to which I have already referred I recollect I did say that tho conditions of peace would be very different if wo found the Russians nt Constantinople from what they would bo if wo found oursolves at St . Petersburg . Well , my lords , within those points lies tho whole scope * of tho variance from tho status quo . Mow far we may deviate from the statm quo no wun can at this moment cay , because that must depend upon events which are not within our power absolutely to control .

    But , this wo can say , that t \» c independence and integrity of lurkey aro undoubted cond : tions— -tlioy constitute tho nina qua von— -that must bo secured , and scuurod effectually . ( Ofiears . ) But how this is t <> bo done uiUBt . again depend upon the progross of events , in tho course of tho negotiations wluoh mny tako pluoo at the inomont . But that soourity xnuflt bo taken—socurity for tho indepondonco and integrity oi 1 urkoy , so far as dopenda upon Itusnin , is really tho objeob from wluoh we aro determined not to depart . ( Cheers . ) JJutngjun , I say , how that is to bo obtained neither 1 nor any man in this IIouso is able to say . Wo know what our object is—our main object at least—ami of course l > y one nuxlo another will obtain

    or we that without which pvuoo is impossible * *• I think , also , exception has Loon ¦ taken to somo expressio ns of mine , as if 1 oxproHHod doubt or iHaboliuf of any tlanpr - irom Uussmn aggression . Now , 1 wish huro to my , \ ) J ;* ? tho K « lost "lurin as to Kuhhiiih iigi » rosaioii against ! urkoy ltut against that nggroHHioii in any ahapo - ^ whether in tho shape of influence , waothor in tlio shapo ( it conquest ) oriuuiiy otlior modo—wo aro prepared to » rotoot hoi-. But , vllh respect to Uiualun .. ggroamon upon J . uropc , independent of her designs upon Turkey , 1 certainly ( Id express no groat alarm , boouuso I iw \ no m-cnt alarm , i ? i ? " . CUn 0 li toftol !«»>» ( mil loss ovory day . \ lMtuikU , \\ J'L , * »" ' . "i i' ° OuUI l ) 0 H' » PI >«»« 1 lo l » o in poascbHion oi UoiiHt . oitUm plo , if Hh « had made good her nggnmHion upon fi ^ iA - H ( u " : for Eum r- bocii « H « l UihiU i ^ l Xl ? , 4 ' ! Clll , "" ° thel 1 tll () ineinw of Uooining formidable ad aangoranB to ISuropo . Without that , my lords 1 01111-i ) ot protend to say that I ftd any rant lmn . l' il

    France to be more powerful than Russia and Amstria put together , and it is , therefore , impossible for' me to look upon Bussia with any great alarm out of her own frontiers , or in such a light as would induce me to think that it would be better to enter at once into a state of war in order to repreSB dangers which I do not feel . Danger from Bussia against Europe appears to me mainl y , if not entirely , to depend upon her power in Turkey and in the Enst . If that power be checked—and it is to be hoped that -we shall succeed in keeping her entirely iree from exciting farther alarm in the Turkish territories—then I cannot possibly think that there need bo any very great alarm as to what she may do

    to Austria , or Prussia , or France , or England . ( Cheers . ) This , however much it has been misunderstood , was really all that I meant to express as to my general incredulity of any danger from Russian aggression . I have now shown your lordships what sort of aggression it is that I am afraid of , and w'ha t sort of aggression it is that I am not afraid of . I am not aware that there is any other part of the observations which I addressed to yonr lordships the other night which requires further explanation . I believe I have already explained everything which , from being misunderstood at the time , appeared to be calculated to excite feelings of distrust in the Government .

    "My lords , I wish I could confine myself to * his explanation ; to the full expression of the sentiments I entertain , and which appeared to me necessary to be explained . I could have wished certainly that I might have been spared the necessity of saying anything about the extraordinary and absurd imputations—the personal imputations—to which I have been exposed . ( Loud cheers . ') I have no fear that your lordships , who are accustomed to weigh the actions and the sentiments of public men , will fail to comprehend the motives from which I have aoted ; and the misrepresentation of them lias been so ludicrously absurd that I feel—indignant as I am—I feel it would not be worthy-of the position which I now occupy—it would not be worthy of the inemory of those with whom 1 have acted—dt would not be worthy of my own character , if I were to condescend . to enter upon

    any justification of my personal motives . ( Loud cheers *) "My lords , It is true that I have more than any other man struggled to preserve the state of peace for this country . I have done so because I thought it my duty to the people of this country—my duty to God and man—to exhaust every possible means of . preserving peace , and my only regret is—though I trust your lordships will acquit me on that point—my only regret is , that I should not have done all , and lest m any way I should have lost some possible means of averting the greatest calamity that can befal a country , for , however glorious any war may be , the calamities which accompany it are heavy enough greatly to outweigh that glory . I know it has been said if you love peace so much , you are unfit for war . My lords , though peace is so dear to my feelings , still I am convinced of "the necessity of this war .

    But how do I wish to make -war ? I wish to make -war in order to obtain a peace ; and I know well that the best mode of making war in order speedily to obtain a peace is to make war with the utmost vigour and determination . ( Loud cheers ) . My noble friends near me know well enough that , peaceable as I am , I liave never shrunk—that , on the contrary , I have given my most ready concurrence to the most active measures of host ility find warlike preparations . Nay , more , I believe I may say % ha ^ will admit that I have personally been more urgent than perhaps any other man in exhorting the speed y conpentration and advance of the alliedforces north of the Balkan in support of the gallant army of Qmcr Pacha , and to extend a helping hand to Austria in order to enable her to-carry out her professions . ( Cheers ) . This , except for the warmth of the feelings under which 1 spoke , I ought not , perhaps , to say ;

    but it is the truth that , in the course we diavo taken I have invariabl y urged the most decided course of action . ( Loud cheers . ) My lord s , I have now no more'to say . I wish to confine myself to this subject without entering upon other topics more or less connected with the war—with the events that led to it , or that may follow from it—I wish to remove understandings which T feel to be perfectly erroneous interpretations of what I said , and I now declare that so far from my former endeavours to preserve peace disqualifying mo from carrying on the war , I think , though of course 1 may bo wrong in tho particular means , I think wo ought to have reaourso to tho most expedient , tho most prompt , the most successful means of carrying it on . ( Cheers ) . 1 maintain , and assort , that my vury lo \ e of pcaco induces me now to enter upon this war , which I unquestionably believe to bq a perfectly just war , and therefore it is that X—so long as I have anything to do with the Government—shall unquestionably enrry it on in such a manner as will bo most likely to secure benefit to England , and to establish a safe and

    honourable peace . " ( Laud and continued cheers . ) Tho Marquis of GLANiuoAnixE . tlescribed the speech of Lord Aberdeen as a " retractation , " and was saluted with cries of " No . " Ho repeated tho descriptive word , and the dissentient 'murmurs were renewed . Then ho went on to make a general onslaught upon the foreign policy of Lord Aberdeen . It was all very well to ^ vritea despatch in December , when the treaty was signed in September , 1829 . What had Lord Aberdeen dono to prevent tho signing of tho treaty ? Why , when tho "disastrous " treaty wna proposed , tlie Minister of Turkoy asked England nnd Franco , anil Austria and Prussia vrhat ho had better do , nnd they said sign . Lord Aberdeen has been " tho most constant , tho most zealous , tho moat powerful , " supporter of arbitrary government . On every possible occasion bo has oppouod tho recognition of reforms in tho qonntiuca with which he had to deal . Was ho not tho

    main-Btay ol Dom Miguel ? Did ho not continually find fault with the Quadruple Treaty ? Did ho not stigmatise tho gallant revolution of Belgium as " tho most nenseless and unintelligible recordoil in history ? " Lord Aberdeen did not tho othor night reply to tho luminous speech of Lord I / pndhurst , but to tikut of tho Foreign Secretary . "Vflmt was itH effect abroad ?

    " He had a very impartial witness to the effect of that speech—he meant a brief telegraphic report of it which had appeared in a paper whicli iiad probably the greatest circulation t > f any on the coatmenb ~ L'Zndependahce Beige . Mark . the position which we were in . The noble earl had justified a great deal of the delay , languor , tardiness , apparent vascillation , and hesitation ia the whole course of our proceed ings on the ground of his wanting to carry swith him the Governments of the continent , especially of the German Powers . ' Then here was a paper published on the borders of Germany , with an immense circulation over the whole of Germany , and what was the statement hi that paper ? The gentleman who reported for it endeavoured to exercise a very

    impartial judgment , and in bis telegraphic despatch , which gave a -veiy few lines of each speech , that of the noble earl was thus reported— ' Earl of Aberdeen a essaye jzisttfier la conduite ate la Rtissie et apluide la cause de la paix . ' That was the view of the speech which he ventured to say-was entertained over the wnole of the continent ; and he asked , was it a matter of -no importance that those © pinions should go forth , even though the noble earl was not supported in them by his colleagues ? He thought , for a-sbort summary , that that gave fairly the tenourof the noble earl ' s speech , for he thought tha . t the noble earl had justified the Emperor in some acts which he had adopted , and had pleaded very strongly in favour of peace . "

    Lord Clanricarde attacked , the Government for the delay in the preparations for war , and imputed it to Lord Aberdeen ; he criticised the appointment of the Duke of Newcastle as War Minister , and declared in favour of Lord Palmerston . Making a ; general attack on the Government , he lemaxked topon ihe number , 330 , with wfeach they came into power , ithe great increase , 400 , during last session , and the striking fact that this "session they cannot carry their measures . " Was cfhe reason For this state of things that there -rcas any want of ability in the ^ members of the GovernmeDt ivhosat in the other House ! He need hardly say anything with regard to the reputation , the ability , and character of Lord John Russell , a statesman respected by all men , followed by many , than whom no one possessed greater practical Parliamentary experience . Was he unaided upon the bench on

    which he sat ? He had upon the one side Lord Palmerston , indisputably the most popular man with" the country in either House of Parliament , and on the other side Mr . Gladstone , a most accomplished debater , undoubtedly the most acute logician in either House , whose pywer of reasoning was almost capable of proving that black was white . T-he Government consisted of a combination of men eminent for administrative capacity , who were at the head of a great party , and [ who , besides that party , were supported by a great number of other , although perhaps less attached friends . How came it , then , that they were in the predicament he had described , for no one could deny that they had been defeated day after day , and obliged to withdraw measures they had proposed , so that , practically , the servants of the Crown could not carry on the business which they thought it desirable to carry on ? He attributed it to the First Lord of the Treasury . " ( Cheers and lauohier . )

    Neither the Parliament nor the country has any confidence in Lord Aberdeen ; and Lord Clanricarde , were it not -for the humble position he occupies , would propose a vote of want of confidence ! Lord Beaumont admired the moralcourage with which Lord Aberdeen had put himself in what some would call a humiliating position , in ' order that he might explain a speech . Certainly it had removed some Buspicions , but was not quite satisfactory . Lord Beaumont then inquired whether a paragraph published in the Press—a journal representing Lord Derby in the press— "was accurate .

    " His Highness Prince Metternich , at the special and personal request of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria , has embodied in n . State paper his view of the arrangements which , in tho presont condition of affairs , may conduce to ' a just and ¦ honourable peace . ' We have reason to believe that those viowshavo boon communicated , although , not officially , to the Eurl of Aberdeen ; and that little doubt prevails , from previous communications that have token place , that they will bo substantially adoptod by tho English Minister . " Lord Aberdeen ' s reply was characteristic . " Tho noble lord has addressed a question to mo whiuh I am perfectly ready to answer , and I hopo-to > bc able to unawer , satisfactorily . I observed the paragraph in tho pnpor which ho has quoted , and I admired its ingenuity , because , my former acquaintance nn < l friendship with Prince Mottenucu

    having been known , it was a very good notion to throw out tho idea that 1 was engaged in negotiations with him in the senso"vrhioh wns endeavoured to bo implied by tho writer oi that nrbiclo . Thorcfoio I thought it very ingenious . But I can only say this : that what the Einporor of Austria may have dono in consulting sin old and valued eowitnt , and X hopo hii -may have consulted him . but whether lie hn » or not , I um pprfuctly ignorant . My noblo and learned Xriand mentioned Prinoo Mottoniioli tho other night with praiao , ami I took up tho aumo strain . I lmvo soon it roportod in somo nnpor , that the Emperor was about to tuko tho advice of Prince Mettornich , and tlint ho has dono so tho paragraph alluded to is 1 hopein Hint part , correct . Whether it bo so

    , , or not I ennnot say . All t know is , as far us T am concerned , there is jaat thotminoarnonntof truth in it as in all the other imputiuiuiiH against mo , which I Imve tho happiness of scoing day alter day—namely , mot u mnglo Hvllablo . ( Ckeern . ~ ) It bo happoiiN that b » mc ( i 1 lmvo boon In aflloo , intimute uva I foriHurly wua with 1 ' riiKo Motbernich , neither directly nor indiioctly lmvo 1 had «> iy ooiumuuioution with him far tho last your and a half until a low days 4 » go , when a ludy frlond of muio told mo hIio was writing to Prmce Mottornich , and I said , ' Pmy niako my bent roinombntncoa to him . '" ( CZiccra and lauff / itcr . ) Lord Urououam declared tlmtLord Aberdeen had

    July 1, 1854.] The Leader. 60s

    July 1 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . 60 S

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), July 1, 1854, page 3, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_01071854/page/3/